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Informal leaders in social media currently characterizes a large part of political and economic 
communication on various challenges societies face, whether localized or transborder (e.g., 
COVID-19 pandemic, global warming). Scholars have theorized that charismatic signaling is 
effective in informal leadership settings; yet empirical evidence remains scarce in understanding 
a ubiquitous phenomenon that marks our times and plays an important role in shaping public 
opinion. In this article, we used two unique data sets extracted from social media to investigate 
the success of charisma for informal leaders, leaders who signal their beliefs and preferences to 
others but having no formal authority over them. Social media offers us a standardized medium 
as well as a natural environment to test our predictions. Using a sample of TED talks and tweets, 
we coded for objective markers of charisma and found that using more verbal charismatic signals 
predicted (a) higher views for TED talks as well as higher ratings for the extent to which the talk 
was found to be inspiring—beyond attractiveness and nonverbal behavior—and (b) more 










Effect of Charismatic Signaling in Social Media Settings: Evidence from TED and Twitter 
 
Can charisma help individuals gain social influence as leaders in the digital sphere? 
Organizational boundaries have been changing for some time now (Afuah, 2003). Individuals are 
increasingly exerting influence in relationships that are not clear cut in terms of hierarchy and for 
which leadership is not institutionalized or formal (Bass & Bass, 2008). However, the workings 
of leadership in digital environments, which characterize much of current social interactions, 
have been largely ignored by leadership scholars (Avolio, Sosik, Kahai, & Baker, 2014).  
Social media settings that mark our times provide a unique and ubiquitous platform for 
formal and informal leaders to exert social influence. The massive amount of information 
circulated by various individuals on social media because of the COVID-19 health crises is a 
good example. Beyond the regular use of social media by government or business leaders to 
reach out to citizens, constituents, or customers, what is particularly interesting concerns the 
leadership of individuals with no formal authority.  
Examples vying to change mindsets include Dr. Anthony Fauci, who although appointed 
as member of the U.S.’s Coronavirus Task force, does not have direct authority over the citizens 
of the U.S.A; yet, he embodies America’s struggle against the virus and misinformed positions 
(BBC News, 2020). Didier Raoult, a French doctor who used social media to share his rather 
unscientific views on the COVID-19 (i.e., promoting hydroxychloroquine as a remedy to 
COVID-19) and strongly shaped a portion of French public opinion during the crisis (Sayare, 
2020) is another case in point. Environmental activist Greta Thunberg, who has a large following 
and has influenced the actions of millions of people throughout the world using social media 
(Haynes, 2019), is another great contemporary example.  
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Apart from their influence on others, and even though they have science on their side, 
Fauci and Thunberg also attract the ire of detractors and trigger massive chatter on social media 
(Specter, 2020; Stracqualursi, 2019). Reassuringly though, Fauci is currently more trusted than is 
Donald Trump, the President of the United States and so too are scientific experts in general 
(Sanger-Katz, 2020). Understanding what makes for effective leadership in media settings where 
there is no formal authority has important implications, particularly with respect to the diffusion 
of political and economic policies, scientific knowledge, or matters of public interest.   
In the present study we focus on one aspect of leadership in digital settings: Charisma and 
its influence in social media platforms. Charisma is theorized to work from a distance and via 
digital means (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002), and is a potent form of social influence per se. 
However, it is still not clear whether charisma can have an impact via a digital medium especially 
a type that is informationally frugal and which does not allow the transmission of nonverbal 
information (e.g., Twitter, see Avolio, et al., 2014). At this time, scholars have only provided 
evidence of the effects of charisma in formal leadership contexts, whether distant or not (Flynn & 
Staw, 2004; Jacquart & Antonakis, 2015). Yet, many of the social media influencers appear, at 
least anecdotally to be charismatic. Thus, our intention is to scientifically examine whether 
charisma matters in such contexts, where oftentimes public opinion battles often occur. To this 
end, we add to the leadership literature in three ways.  
First, we examine whether charismatic signaling (i.e., the use of verbal and nonverbal 
behaviors to communicate emotions, symbols and values, Antonakis, Bastardoz, Jacquart, & 
Shamir, 2016) has a quantifiable impact on measures of influence in digital settings and where 
leadership is informal. We used field data from two sources (i.e. TED talks and Twitter)—which, 
given their standardized format and data availability—grant us with an unusual level of control 
(Bamberger & Pratt, 2010). In addition to providing a relevant example of social interaction 
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where individuals jockey for status and social influence by signaling their skills and ideas, social 
media also provide a robust environment to test our hypotheses without the potential cofounding 
effects stemming from power derived from formal (i.e., hierarchical) leadership influence (i.e., 
viewing a TED talk or promoting it is a purely voluntary action on the part of the follower).  
Second, we provide a strong test of whether objective markers (signals) of charisma, as a 
methodologically robust alternative to perceptual measures of charisma, matter for leader 
outcomes. Unlike perceptual measures of leadership or of outcomes, objective measures are 
particularly advantageous in order to avoid various sources of endogeneity bias (i.e., perceptions 
of charisma can be tainted by a host of observed and unobserved variables, see Hansbrough, 
Lord, & Schyns, 2015). Thus, in addition to extending our understanding of the effects of 
charismatic signaling, this study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that objective 
markers and objectively measured outcomes should be preferred, when possible, to perceptual 
measures.  
Third, as concerns the TED study, we will investigate whether the effects of verbal 
charismatic signaling go beyond nonverbal behavior, including facial attractiveness. There is a 
persistent belief especially in popular circles, that nonverbal communication is more important 
than is verbal communication. For example, Nguyen notes: the “breakdown of human 
communication [is] 7 percent spoken words, 38 percent tone of voice, and 55 percent body 
language. While some disagree on those numbers, all agree nonverbal communication dominates 
verbal.” (Nguyen, 2014). This oft-repeated claim incorrectly stems from previous work 
examining the congruence of nonverbal emotion with single communicated words (Mehrabian & 
Wiener, 1967). For facial appearance, abundant research shows that it matters much for leader 
selection and outcomes in general in low information environments (Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & 
Mende-Siedlecki, 2015). As such, appearance could feed into ratings of leadership and outcomes. 
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However, in observational studies scholars often do not control for appearance or nonverbal 
behavior when measuring leadership and predicting outcomes, thus potentially exposing their 
estimator to a serious endogeneity problems (due to omitted variables). Thus, it is currently 
unclear if measures of leadership are confounded by leader looks or other nonverbal signals. 
Moreover, it is not clear if an initial classification, which can quickly occur on the basis of facial 
appearance and nonverbal behavior, can be overridden by verbal charismatic signaling 
(Antonakis & Eubanks, 2017).   
Overall, we believe our work has important theoretical and practical implications for 
leadership in general and informal leadership more specifically. As concerns the latter, that 
activists, bloggers, and the like use the social media pit to engage followers and promote their 
ideas, investigating whether charismatic signaling can help to gain social influence is both timely 




 Research on charisma has historically focused on how charismatic leaders affect 
followers. First defined as some kind of “supernatural” quality (Weber, 1947, p. 329) and then 
proposed as a stand-alone leadership theory (House, 1977), charisma was then enveloped in 
transformational leadership (Bass, 1985). A common feature of these foundational works is the 
definition of charisma with unobservable qualities (i.e., “supernatural qualities” or “gift”) or 
definition of charisma both in terms of general behaviors and outcomes. For example, “idealized 
influence” (Bass & Avolio, 1995) refers to followers’ attribution of a leader’s ability to instill 
trust in followers, appear powerful, or to convey a sense of mission and measured as such. 
However, what makes a leader instill trust or seem powerful? Trust and seeming powerful are 
outcomes of some process; moreover, coupled with the vagueness of the measure, and a host of 
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other methodological limitations, including affect for the leader (Yammarino, Cheong, Kim, & 
Tsai, 2020), suggests that such measures cannot be modeled as causes of other outcomes 
(Antonakis, et al., 2016; van Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013) nor can some of these measures be 
manipulated (Antonakis et al., 2016). Table 1 provides a brief overview of conceptualizations of 
charisma, and shows researchers should show a strong preference for the signaling perspective 
(we elaborate on the strengths of using a signaling approach later). 
Numerous scholars have reacted to fundamental issues concerning charisma and have 
suggested that charisma should evolve in a construct in its own right (Antonakis, et al., 2016; 
Yukl, 1999) particularly given limitations in current psychometric measures of charisma (van 
Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013). In this article, we make a distinction between charismatic 
leadership, which is a theory of charisma per se, and its signaling aspect; the latter is the focus of 
this article. Taking stock of the criticisms on poor construct conceptualization (MacKenzie, 2003) 
we use a current definition that helps inform an objective operationalization of charisma; in doing 
so, we disentangle the cause (i.e., charisma) from its effects (i.e., influence), which are two major 
problems identified by critics (van Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013). Differentiating the cause from 
its effects is not only a definitional issue but an empirical one. Scholars have often used 
perceptual measures of charisma (e.g., MLQ) to predict the causal effect of charisma on 
outcomes—often perceptual too—such as the quality of the relationship between the leader and 
his or her followers. Perceptual measures cannot be used as independent variables because they 
are themselves endogenous constructs; thus, even modeling objective outcomes as dependent 
variables will not solve the endogeneity problem because omitted variables can still account for 
the correlation of the leader rating and the outcome (Fischer & Dietz, 2020). Instead, researchers 
should focus on objective behaviors, which are not prone to being outcomes of unmodeled 
process or perceptions. Drawing from this observation, we use the following definition of 
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charisma, in terms of being “values-based, symbolic, and emotion-laden leader signaling” 
(Antonakis, et al., 2016, p. 304); signaling refers to “things one does that are visible and that are 
in part designed to communicate” (Spence, 2002, p. 434).  
[insert Table 1 here] 
 Charismatic signaling occurs by means of specific verbal or nonverbal behaviors that are 
prototypical of charismatic leaders or individuals (Awamleh & Gardner, 1999; Den Hartog & 
Verburg, 1997; Towler, 2003). For instance, communicating metaphorically, a marker of 
charismatic signaling, can be objectively coded and thus does not require one to measure 
perceptions of observers (we detail all the charismatic signals later). Importantly, charisma from a 
signaling point of view explains variance that is not captured by communication skills—like 
speech structure or tempo of the speech—or other individual-level effects (Antonakis, Fenley, & 
Liechti, 2011); it also positively affect followers’ perceptions of leader outcomes at micro and 
macro levels of performance (Antonakis, et al., 2011; Jacquart & Antonakis, 2015). It can be 
directly manipulated and explains worker performance in strongly incentivized counterfactual 
conditions, even if the treatment is administered by video (Meslec, Curseu, Fodor, & Kenda, 
2020).  
The mechanism through which the effect of charisma is thought to occur is via 
“inferences” (Erickson & Krull, 1999). Individuals develop schemas by being repeatedly exposed 
to attributes indicative of a prototype such that later exposure to one of few indicators is enough 
to trigger a schema (Jacquart & Antonakis, 2015). For example individuals who express some 
prototypical behaviors of charismatic leadership (i.e., the signal) will be assumed to hold some 
underlying leadership qualities (e.g., strong leadership skills). The charismatic signals that 
individuals send are credible information about their leadership abilities to the extent that the 
signals are hard to emulate by low ability individuals (Antonakis et al, 2016). For example, 
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wearing a yellow wig is easy to replicate by low ability individuals (beyond the point that it is 
hard to see how this headpiece can signal leadership ability). However, crafting a well-thought 
metaphor requires knowing the topic, the audience, and having strong verbal skills and 
intelligence. Unlike wearing a wig, these rhetorical skills are hard to acquire and thus credible—
and honest—signals of an individual’s qualities. These arguments, and similar ones regarding 
signaling (Grabo, Spisak, & van Vugt, 2017; Reh, Van Quaquebeke, & Giessner, 2017) parallel 
discussions in economic or evolutionary models of costly signaling (cf. Bliegebird & Smith, 
2005; Spence, 2002; Zahavi, 1977). 
Important to note is that the source of social influence we focus on differs from the work 
on persuasion of Cialdini (2001) or other related sources of influence inducing compliance due to 
situational forces and authority (Milgram, 1963), group conformity (Asch, 1956), or because of 
social norms per se (see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Charisma rather 
refers to a broader set of information-transmission signals such as symbols, values, and emotions 
(Antonakis et al, 2016) that engage observers and influence the framing of events, the affective 
states of observers, and their behaviors; it concerns voluntary following too, which is particularly 
germane for obtaining social influence in informal leadership settings like those in the digital 
arena.   
Formal and Informal Leadership 
A formal leader-follower relationship is a relationship in which the leader is an 
institutional representative either by election or by formal appointment in an organization and 
where the leader has asymmetric coercive or rewarding power over subordinates (Bass & Bass, 
2008; Koslowsky, Schwarzwald, & Ashuri, 2001). Formal leadership often implies the 
establishment of a hierarchy, of titles, and the bestowal of power to the appointed (or self-
appointed) leader over followers or institutions, which have been purposefully created. In 
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comparison, informal leaders, like those we will study in the digital sphere, do not benefit from 
an institutionalized leadership position or have authority over their followers; instead, they 
achieve social influence through other mechanisms such as expertise, referent power, 
informational power, legitimacy of dependence, or other inferential processes (Raven, 1993; 
Taggar, Hackett, & Saha, 1999). Moreover their followers form an emergent movement (as 
opposed to a formal institution or group). 
For us, informal leadership is somewhat related to definitions of leader emergence—yet it 
differs from emergence in fundamental ways. Leader emergence is usually studied in formal 
settings oftentimes with leaderless groups where actions of individuals require coordination 
(Kaiser, Hogan, & Craig, 2008). Common definitions of leader emergence include (a) “whether 
(or to what degree) an individual is viewed as a leader by others” (Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 
2002, p. 767); (b) “processes by which leaders came to possess leadership capacity [or] follower 
recognition” (Dinh et al., 2014, p. 57)  or (c) “being perceived as leader-like, usually in a group 
of strangers,” (Kaiser, et al., 2008, p. 97). Of course, in consequential settings, leader emergence 
at a later stage can also determine leader appointment. However, given the context we are 
examining, we are only interested on whether informal leaders can, in the first instance, impact 
others via charisma in some way, where direct hierarchy is not present (cf. Koslowsky, et al., 
2001), and where they derive their power from using some means of social influence (Berdahl, 
1996; Hollander, 1961). Thus, we define informal leaders as those individuals who signal their 
beliefs and preferences to others but have no formal authority over them.  
As within a formal setting, the informal leadership effect occurs when people follow by 
incurring some cost—by cost we mean support the ideas of the informal leader, promoting them 
within their personal networks, or by acting in line with the leader’s beliefs and preferences. 
Greta Thunberg is an informal leader because she signals her beliefs and preferences with respect 
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to environment and global warming; her influence is reified in spontaneous social movements. 
The informal leadership process occurs because individuals choose to follow her and support her 
mission by expressing and spreading her word through social media, peaceful demonstration, or 
other costly actions.  
Scholars like Weber (1968) suggested that charisma may help an individual to emerge as 
a leader. There is also evidence showing that charismatic individuals have a higher likelihood of 
being appointed to positions of leadership in political and economic institutions (Jacquart & 
Antonakis, 2015). Yet, little is known about the effect of charisma in informal but consequential 
settings, like those characterizing the digital era, wherein influential players can have a big 
impact on shaping public opinion (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Given that emergent leadership is 
a process of social influence and that charisma can yield social influence (cf. Shamir, House, & 
Arthur, 1993), we expect too that charismatic signaling positively affects social influence in 
digital interactions, which do not entail a formal leader-follower relationship (and of course, 
where the leader too is not seen face to face).  
Operationalizing charismatic signaling 
 
A common way to measure charisma is to use questionnaires like the Multifactor 
Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) and to ask followers to rate a target leader on several items, 
which are thought to tap into various leadership dimensions. Although questionnaires grant some 
advantages such as cost-efficiency or ease of administration, they raise several major 
methodological issues, the most prevalent one being endogeneity bias (Antonakis, Bendahan, 
Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010; Eden, 2020; Hansbrough, et al., 2015). All MLQ-type measures, 
despite their popularity, fail to measure charisma as an independent variable (Antonakis et al, 
2016). That is, ratings of these measures are endogenous and can depend on a host of omitted 
causes, including effects of implicit theories of raters, common method biases, social desirability 
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and leniency biases, hindsight bias, performance-cue biases, among other biases on the part of the 
raters (Antonakis, et al., 2010; Golden, 1992; Lord, Binning, Rush, & Thomas, 1978; Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003; Rush, Thomas, & Lord, 1977). For instance, if raters have 
knowledge that the leader has been effective they will rate the leader higher on prototypically 
good forms of leadership (Lord, et al., 1978); even basic things like facial appearance can matter 
greatly (Todorov, et al., 2015). Because measures of perceptions and measures of outcome are 
confounded, they share many omitted causes and cannot be used reliably to make causal claims—
they should be modeled only as endogenous variables (Antonakis et al, 2016). How, then, should 
scholars model charisma as an independent variable?   
As shown in Table 1, an alternative solution to questionnaire measures is the use of 
objective measures of charisma, where the adjective “objective” refers to the fact that these 
measures are free from the perceptual biases that affect MLQ-type questionnaires. Objective 
measures of charisma refer to a set of verbal and nonverbal signals that are theorized to trigger 
symbolic meanings and provide moral justifications for the mission, among other mechanisms 
(Jacquart & Antonakis, 2015; Mio, Riggio, Levin, & Reese, 2005; Towler, 2003). In practice, 
these charismatic signals can either be measured in archival data (or directly observed), in which 
case researchers code the occurrence of a given set of signals; or they can be manipulated 
(Antonakis, et al., 2011; Towler, 2003). Although objective measures of charisma alleviate biases 
linked to perceptual measures, researchers must take appropriate actions to deal with 
measurement error and to statistically control for possible correlates of the signals that may also 
correlate with the outcomes; thus, appropriate control variables must be included in the model.  
Previous studies have looked at verbal and nonverbal signals jointly (Antonakis, et al., 
2011; Awamleh & Gardner, 1999; Frese, Beimel, & Schoenborn, 2003; Gordon & Berson, 2018) 
or independently (Den Hartog & Verburg, 1997; Jacquart & Antonakis, 2015). In this study, we 
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focused our attention on verbal charismatic signaling tactics and measured charisma with verbal 
charismatic markers; we also measured nonverbal charismatic signals (in the TED) context 
separately. Separating these aspects of charisma allows for some degree of comparability with the 
Twitter context, wherein we coded only written messages. Our measurement strategy also allows 
for comparability to the Jacquart and Antonakis (2015) study of U.S. presidential elections, 
wherein they only coded for charisma using written transcripts of nominee speeches (given that 
the data spanned from 1916 onward and audio/video recordings were not available for a large 
part of the sample). Coding only verbal signals is usually sufficient to assess charisma because 
verbal and nonverbal behaviors are correlated (Antonakis, et al., 2011); the latter depends much 
on what is being said.  
Note, we are not claiming that delivery is not important; it is and both verbal and 
nonverbal aspects should be modeled to obtain a full picture of charismatic effect. Yet, it is hard 
to see how nonsensical prose and very weak arguments could influence others even if delivered 
with gusto. Although we believe charisma requires the use of verbal and nonverbal signaling and 
that both should be jointly modelled, we expect that the verbal component is more important. A 
useful study to examine this point is the data from Antonakis et al. (2011), Study 2, where 
participants viewed videos of target leaders and did not see the leaders live. These researchers 
modeled charisma as a total score composed of verbal and nonverbal charisma signaling. We 
reanalyzed this data by splitting the verbal and nonverbal charisma components, while still 
accounting for other fixed (constant) effects due to the individual. Results showed that only 
verbal charisma significantly predicted all outcomes with slight improvements in variance 
predicted (see Appendix I). Still to impose a more robust test on our hypotheses we will control 
for host of nonverbal signals including cues like attractiveness as well as voice intensity and 
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pitch, body language, as well as other cues like reputation, and professional status (see Grabo, et 
al., 2017; Reh, et al., 2017).  
Verbal markers of charisma include: using stories and anecdotes, metaphors and 
comparisons, rhetorical questions, three-part lists, contrasts, moral conviction, expressing the 
sentiments of the collective, among others (Antonakis, et al., 2011). These tactics are effective 
not only because of inferences observers make about the individual’s abilities, but also because 
they affect the way people process the information transmitted. Stories, for instance, increase the 
likelihood that the message will be remembered and improves its understandability (Bower, 
1976). Metaphors and comparisons use imagery to simplify a message, trigger emotional 
reactions, and increase its retention (Charteris-Black, 2005; Mio, et al., 2005); these tactics can 
have a strong influence on information processes and ultimately can shape thought (Thibodeau, 
Hendricks, & Boroditsky, 2017). Expressing the sentiments of the collective reduces the 
psychological distance between the person who delivers the message and the listener. 
Communicating one’s values signals normative values and makes the person vulnerable; they are 
costly too in another way with respect to the extent that the individual has to walk the talk, and it 
also limits the range of followers that can be influenced to the extent that the values do not 
overlap with those of the collective (for details see Antonakis, et al., 2011; Antonakis, Fenley, & 
Liechti, 2012). Thus, the charismatic effect will only occur to the extent that the signals used are 
quality signals and the values resonate with the observers.   
As mentioned, given the sophistication of these techniques, charismatic signaling should 
be honest signaling (Antonakis et al., 2016) because theoretically, producing the signal is more 
costly for low than for high ability (Zahavi, 1977, 1981). Thus, the signal conveys honest 
information on the individual’s ability. Consequently, those who signal charisma should have 
more social influence even in the absence of authority presumably because they will be taken 
 
 15 
more seriously, communicate a message that better resonates with observers (and galvanize them 
to the extent that the values appeal to them), and leave a more vivid memory.  
Although the primary interest we have is in the verbal signals we control for all important 
nonverbal signals too in our specifications. Nonverbal charismatic signals matter also, and 
include use of facial expression, body gesture, as well as use of voice (see Antonakis et al., 
2011). Similar to verbal charismatic signals, nonverbal signals affect how people process 
information. For example, smiling can act as a reward to reinforce a behavior, a dominance 
signal, or a way to maintain social bonds (Martin, Rychlowska, Wood, & Niedenthal, 2017). 
Nonverbal signals are also costly signals in that they convey a certain emotional state, 
confidence, or other information that engages the speaker in a particular course of action; 
moreover the emotional state conveyed reinforces what is being said (Wasielewski, 1985; 
Willner, 1984). As with verbal signals, nonverbal signals are honest because they are difficult to 
fake for those who do not really feel a certain emotional state, a particular level of confidence or 
sense of purpose (e.g., it is easy to smile when we feel truly happy to be on stage but harder when 
we feel stress and overwhelmed but want to pretend otherwise).  
Using social media contexts as a robust test of charismatic signaling  
Despite being unusual contexts for research on leadership, social media platforms allow 
for rigorous analysis of charismatic signaling and give us a number of methodological advantages 
(cf. Bamberger & Pratt, 2010). First, they provide objective, and perfectly observed measures of 
social influence in a field setting (i.e., TED views, Tweet retweets) where social influence is an 
outcome of informal leadership and is defined as the ability individuals have to propagate their 
beliefs and preferences. Views and shares are a proxy of social influence because they increase 
the likelihood that the message will be propagated and accepted (e.g., see Phang, Zhang, & 
Sutanto, 2013). Individuals who write tweets or give TED talks do so to share their opinions, and 
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gain social influence on a web-based community (Toubia & Stephen, 2013). Views and shares 
capture the performance of a tweet or TED talk because they are costly to view and promote: 
watching a video takes time and sharing it engages ones’ reputation. Next, social media also 
provide standardized environments to study a phenomenon. Social media have specific rules, 
formal codes, and formats that provide for a homogenous testing environment that limits 
extraneous influences and unmodeled variance. For instance, TED talks have a set time, are given 
on a round red rug in front of an audience, and are part of a series of talks on various topics; 
videos are produced in a similar format and promoted on a common platform. Similarly, tweets 
are published on a standard platform, have a maximum of 140 characters (at the time of data 
gathering), and follow strict editing rules within a standardized layout. Both contexts allow little 
deviation from established norms and provide us with observations that are in a tightly controlled 
setting; what performance differences we observed are thus because of individuals or contextual 
factors that we can measure and model.  
 Finally, social media contexts fit our research question because they provide 
environments in which individuals who consume the message (i.e., receivers) probably have little 
or no contact with the individuals who formulate and communicate the message (i.e., senders). 
The weakness of social ties and the absence of reward or coercive leader power over the receivers 
ensures that formal leadership status, a confounding factor in typical leadership studies, is absent 
from the social interactions in the present studies. In addition, sharing a video or a tweet 
legitimizing the status of the sender and contributes to the process of leader influence. Thus, as 
mentioned previously regarding our contribution, such a context provides a robust environment to 
test the effects of charismatic signaling free from the confound of authority. Importantly too, such 
a context provides a strong test of whether charismatic signaling works from a distance via digital 
communication channels. Thus, we tested the following:  
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Hypothesis 1: Verbal charismatic signaling predicts objective measures of social 
influence in social media contexts  
Another key issue is whether we are still measuring charisma in this context. Charisma is 
an inferential process (Jacquart & Antonakis, 2015). Individuals are charismatic in the eyes of 
others. Thus, apart from objective performance metrics, we expect that measures of charismatic 
signaling will be positively related to adjectives that are prototypical of charismatic leaders (e.g., 
that they are inspiring); we test this assertion in the context of TED talks given the availability of 
data ratings from video viewers. This hypothesis is akin to a manipulation check because we are 
not examining the impact of charisma on performance; rather, we examine if perceivers feel the 
consequences of charisma in a way the theory would suggest. Thus, we tested the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Verbal charismatic signaling in social media predicts viewer ratings of 
adjectives prototypical of charismatic leaders 
 We tested our hypotheses using two unique data sets extracted from social media 
platform. In the first study, we extracted videos from TED and coded for verbal and nonverbal 
charismatic tactics. Controlling for different variables including attractiveness (Tskhay, Zhu, & 
Rule, 2017; Tskhay, Zhu, Zou, & Rule, 2018), we measured whether verbal charismatic tactics 
could predict the number of views. The second study used a similar methodology but focused on 
written communication; we downloaded tweets from Twitter and used retweets as a dependent 
variable.  
STUDY 1: TED 
 
In Study 1, we used field data from TED (https://www.ted.com/). TED is a nonprofit 
organization that invites speakers from various backgrounds to give talks of about 18 minutes or 
less on various topics. Participants usually prepare some months in advance and receive guidance 
from the organization, leading to relatively standardized talks in terms of structure, support, and 
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delivery style. Participants deliver their talks on stage, with professional lighting and 
microphones. The talks are recorded with high-quality video cameras, and uploaded on the TED 
official website, meaning they can be watched, shared and downloaded for free (the talks are also 
mirrored on Youtube). The number of views indicates how many people watch a given talk and is 
displayed below the video.  
Data and sample 
 
We analyzed the transcripts of 240 randomly selected TED talks directly from the entire 
population of TED talks available on official website of TED on the day of the data collection. 
We chose this number of talks after running a power analysis in which we assumed half of the 
effect (r = 0.31) reported by Antonakis et al., (2011). Assuming the full model has an R-square of 
.60, including an effect of nonverbal charisma of .023, the power analysis suggested a minimum 
sample size of n = 136 (for power of 80%); we doubled the sample size to be on the safe side 
(suggesting that we would have more than 90% probability to detect the effect). We selected the 
240 talks randomly. The transcripts for the talks are made available by the TED organization. We 
collected the dependent and control variables from various web-based sources, as indicated 
below.  
Dependent measures 
We collected two types of dependent measures to test hypotheses 1 and 2. The first 
measure was the number of views per talk, a performance outcome which served as a proxy for 
social influence. Although some TED talks benefit from more promotion than do others, it is fair 
to assume that a significant part of the variance in views is attributable to the frequency at which 
a given video is shared or viewed following promotion by independent viewers in various ways 
(e.g. e-mails, Facebook or other social media postings, conversations); of course TED official 
organizers too promote talks they believe will be well received by viewers. Still, whether a talk 
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goes on to be heavily viewed will depend in large on viewers’ efforts to promote the talk on 
social media or by other means.  
We operationalized the dependent variable of hypothesis 2 (i.e. prototypical inferences 
regarding charismatic leaders) by using publicly available ratings. Viewers can rate each video 
posted on the official website of TED with key words describing the video. We gathered data on 
the keywords “inspiring” and “persuasive.” The data reflect the percentage for each key word that 
indicates the proportion of viewers who thought the video was “inspiring” or “persuasive.” We 
collected the ratings for these two variables because these adjectives overlap with outcomes often 
associated with charismatic leaders (Antonakis, et al., 2011; Shamir, et al., 1993). Of course, 
these data are limited in that raters chose to provide these ratings (i.e., there is a selection effect, 
which we cannot model). Still, this endogenous choice to rate a talk as inspiring or persuasive is 
useful for us because the effort to provide this rating is costly and theoretically, it should be a 
function of how emotionally engaged viewers were when they saw the talk.  
Independent variables and controls 
 
 Verbal Charismatic signaling. Many markers of charismatic signaling have been 
identified (Den Hartog & Verburg, 1997; Frese, et al., 2003). In this study, we focused our 
attention on verbal behaviors and coded the nine verbal tactics—part of the charismatic 
leadership tactics—identified and tested by Antonakis, Fenley and Liechti (2011) and also used 
in other settings (Jacquart & Antonakis, 2015). Using these same nine signaling tactics thus 
allows for a strong and comparative test regarding whether they work in informal leadership 
settings too.  
We measured for the presence of the charismatic signals to frame the message, including 
(a) metaphors and analogies, (b) stories and anecdotes, (c) contrasts, (d) three-part lists, and (e) 
rhetorical questions as well as tactics focusing on the substance of the message including (f) 
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moral conviction, (g) expressing the sentiments of the collective, (h) setting high and ambitious 
goals, and (i) creating confidence that goals can be achieved. Three trained coders (denoted for 
notational purposes A, B, and C) coded each transcript at the sentence level and reported binary 
measures (0, 1) for the presence of each tactic; we summed the tactics to derive the speech level 
score. The coders had high agreement
 
 with a standardized alpha reliability coefficient of .96 at 
the speech level; the standardized reliability coefficient at the sentence level was .81. We also 
computed measures of agreement at the sentence level with pairwise agreement between coders 
A, B, and C of 82.25%, 79.94% and 82.60% and pairwise Cohen’s kappas (pairwise agreement 
corrected for chance effects) at .57 (SE = .01, z = 113.98, p < .001), .49 (SE = .01, z = 98.35, p < 
.001), and .52 (SE = .01, z = 100.49, p < .001), respectively (Landis & Koch, 1977).  
 Attractiveness. There is evidence that facial attractiveness provides several advantages to 
individuals across a wide range of situations including of leadership emergence and other 
measures of success (Antonakis & Eubanks, 2017; Todorov, 2017; Zebrowitz, 1997, 2017; 
Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008) including charisma (Tskhay, et al., 2017; Tskhay, et al., 2018). 
Thus, given the prominence of looks on this platform, it is likely that attractiveness influences the 
number of views and explains why potential viewers initially click on and watch one talk rather 
than another. We thus collected, resized, and recolored (i.e., into black and white) pictures from 
TED speakers from public sources. Pictures were frontal face shots, with neutral facial 
expressions. We asked a sample of participants to rate pictures for attractiveness using a 9 point-
Likert scale (1= Not at all attractive, 9 = very attractive); such ratings correlate strongly with 
objective measurement of facial symmetry (Rhodes, Proffitt, Grady, & Sumich, 1998). We 
recruited 244 participants from a university subject pool, and each participant rated 10 pictures. 
Rating agreements were statistically significant, F(243, 2196) = 4.32, r-square = .32, p < .001, 
and agreement was relatively strong ICC1 = .25 (SE = .02), ICC2 = .77 (Bliese, 2000).  
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 Control variables. We include three types of control variables to minimize the possibility 
of omitted variable bias: Variables about the speaker, about the event, and about the speech. In 
order to control for individual differences, we included sex (i.e., male = 1, female = 0), previous 
experience at TED (=1, else = 0), and notoriety before the talk. Controlling for speaker fame is 
important because, for example, Bono the lead singer of U2, who was one of the speakers we 
randomly selected, will benefit from his fan base in comparison to an unknown artist; thus, we 
measured fame through the length of the personal Wikipedia page one month before the TED talk 
was delivered. We also controlled for wearing red (=1, else = 0) because previous research 
suggests that this color can have a positive effect on outcomes (Elliot & Maier, 2014), and for 
wearing glasses, which can have a negative effect (Tskhay, et al., 2017). 
Finally and as a robustness check we included two aspects of nonverbal charismatic 
signals: Use of gesturing coded on a 0 (not all all) to 5 (frequently if not always) scale and voice 
measured using Praat, a computer program (Boersma & Weenink, 2011). For the former, two 
trained coders saw the videos (without sound) and independently rated the presenters on: (a) 
Body gestures, that is, the target’s use of arms to do rhythmic movements, or body gestures 
highlighting what is being said—the correlation between the coders was r = .73 and the 
concordance  = .69, SE = .03, and (b) Facial expressions, where the coders rated any gestures 
conveyed in the face—r = .60 between the two coders and the concordance was  =  .53, SE = 
.04. We created an index, nonverbal gesturing by averaging the two dimensions, and used one 
rater’s score to “instrument” for the other (analysis method explained below); the correlation for 
the two measures was r = .69 and the concordance  = .65, SE = .03. For the ratings of voice, we 
extracted audio files from the official website of TED, selected, when relevant the first three 
minutes and the last three minutes of the speech and used the embedded functionalities of the 
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program to assess automatically (a) Pitch mean and pitch standard deviation measured in Hz (and 
their interaction) and (b) Intensity and intensity standard deviation measured in dB (and their 
interaction). We included the interactions of the two variables given that observers may be more 
or less receptive to variabilities at certain levels. Note, we only extracted an excerpt for 
comparability (given varying length of talks) and that voice parameters of individuals can be 
assumed to be relatively constant; indeed, voice identification algorithms are extremely accurate 
even when using very short inputs (Ma, Zuo, Li, & Chen, 2020).  
 We used TED descriptions of the talks to classify them into exclusive categories bearing 
mind that the categories are general enough to accommodate similar themes, but not too specific 
that it requires an inordinate amount of categories. Drawing from the content of the talks and the 
background of the speakers, we settled on 13 categories including arts, biology, business, design, 
education, electronics, mechanical engineering, medicine, politics, psychology, science (i.e., 
chemistry and physics), space exploration, others; thus, we modeled 12 dummy variables to 
control for the topic of the talk, which may affect target audience sizes and interest in the talk. 
For example, a talk on quantum physics will probably appeal to a smaller population than a talk 
on personal development, all else equal (cf. Pan, Yan, & Hua, 2016). We controlled too for the 
use of slides and the length of the talk, both in duration and number of characters in the talk (thus 
the latter would, controlling for duration reflect rate of speaking). We also controlled for the 
profession of the speaker (e.g., artist, engineer, doctor, business practitioner) using 10 categories 
(thus, we modeled 9 dummy variables). Finally, we controlled for the time effects by including 
the age of the talk (months old), given that older talks will have had more time to collect views. 




At the country level, we used data from the World Bank to control for economic 
development and population size in the country where the conference took place (i.e., the 
country’s logged GDP and logged population size). Controlling for these macro-level variables 
ensures that we capture economic and technological effects, as well as potential audience size 
that could affect the diffusion of the talk. Finally, we also controlled for whether the event was an 
official TED event—that occurs at lower frequency and usually benefits from global media 
coverage—or a TED
x
 event, organized by local groups, occurring more frequently and benefiting 
mainly from local media coverage. The TED
x
 talks are thus seen as less prestigious than are TED 
talks, though selected TED
x
 talks are still heavily promoted via the main TED website, from 
which we drew the talks. 
Estimation method 
Although the coders were quite reliable in coding the charismatic signals, they were not 
perfectly reliable. Averaging the three ratings and using an index of the three raters would help 
alleviate measurement error somewhat, but it still does not remove the problem of measurement 
error entirely (Antonakis, et al., 2010; Ree & Carretta, 2006). Thus, we must correct for this 
source of bias, because measurement error creates a correlation between the ill-measured variable 
(i.e., ratings of charismatic signaling tactics, denoted as 𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑠) and the error 𝜖 of the variable we 
predict (Antonakis, et al., 2010). We opted to use an instrumental variable Poisson regression 
model to predict the number of views (a count variable) and an instrumental variable two-stages 
least squares (2SLS) regression model to predict the ratings “inspiring” and “persuasive.” In both 
cases, we “instrumented” the charismatic signaling scores of coder A (the referent variable) with 
the scores of coders B and C (the instrumental variables)—refer to Equations 1 and 2. The 
procedure we used is called the model-implied instrumental variable (MIIV) estimation in 
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psychometrics (Bollen, 1996) or the multiple indicator solution in econometrics (Wooldridge, 
2010).  
We used the MIIV estimator instead of a latent variable model, because the MIIV 
estimator readily provides a closed-form solution to the problem of measurement error in the first 
stage of the model and given too that simultaneous equation models with latent variables and 
count data can be tricky to fit; we could also rely on the extensive suite of post estimation 
routines (endogeneity and overidentification tests, marginal effects) provided by the analysis 
software Stata (2017). More importantly, as proven by Bollen (2012), the MIIV estimator purges 
the estimates from endogeneity by using implied instrumental variables that correlate with the 
independent variable but not with the error terms. Of course this model assumes, as do other 
maximum-likelihood factor variable models that measurement errors in the proxies are 
orthogonal and that the referent (or scaling) indicator is a one-to-one proxy of the latent variable 
(i.e., its loading is constrained to unity).  
We estimated the following models, using an iterated generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator, which provides efficiency gains in finite samples (Hall, 2005), combined with 
a sandwich estimate of the variance (i.e., robust standard errors). The first model is an 
instrumental-variable Poisson regression (where the predicted value of CLTA from Equation 1 is 
used in Equation 2; note, in the case of maximum likelihood estimators, the disturbances of the 
two equations are allowed to covary to account for the endogeneity of the regressor in the first 
stage model): 
First stage:                   
𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐴 =  𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐵 + 𝜋2𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐶 + ∑ 𝜉𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘
43
𝑘=1
+ 𝑣  
 
(1) 
Second stage:               𝑉𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐴 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘
43
𝑘=1
+  𝑒 (2) 
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The second model is an instrumental variable, 2SLS regression model (where the predicted value 
of CLTA from Equation 3 is used in Equation 4):  
First stage:                   
𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐴 =  𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐵 + 𝜇2𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐶 + ∑ 𝜇𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘
43
𝑘=1
+ 𝜉  
 
(3) 
Second stage:               𝑦𝑧  =  𝜔0𝑧 + 𝜔1𝑧𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐴 + ∑ 𝜏𝑧𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘
43
𝑘=1
+  𝑤𝑧 (4) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑧 (an element of 1, 2) and refers to the two dependent variables, for two separate 
outcomes, “inspiring” and “persuasive.” Note, because the dependent variables are proportions 
out of 100 (i.e., that can be transformed to a 0 to 1 scale) and thus bounded, we estimated the 
mode using a logit transformation of the dependent variable (Baum, 2008). For the models where 
we included gesturing, we used the same procedure. Note, regressing the scores of the coders on 
the modeled independent variables indicated that one of the coders was significantly biased by 
the facial appearance and sex of the presenters, 2(4) = 24.18, p < .001; the other was biased too, 
but less so, 2(4) = 7.86, p = .10. Thus, we instrumented the most biased coder ratings with the 
ratings of the other coder (that we control for facial appearance and sex, though does mitigate  
this problem).  
Results 
 
 Refer to Table 2 for the means, standard deviations and correlations of key variables.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
First, we report on the distribution of the average charismatic signaling scores (average score 
across three coders) to examine if there was systematic bias—stemming from selection (i.e., 
speaker selected on charisma or trained to increase it)—in the scores. We report on the raw 
distribution (Doornik-Hansen test of normality, 𝜒2(2) = 60.24, p < .0001) and that of the views 
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conditioned on all the controls (Doornik-Hansen test of normality, 𝜒2(2) =  2.62, p = .27); the 
latter is important to do given that duration and words spoken, at the minimum, necessarily set 
the higher bound of the charisma score (and the rest of control are important too; overall, all the 
controls account for 71.06% of the variance in the charisma scores). As Figure 1 confirms too, 
the predicted charismatic signaling scores are normally distributed, suggesting little selection.  
[Figure 1 here] 
 Next, we report the results of the hierarchical regression analysis in Tables 3. The results 
supported Hypothesis 1 and indicated that adding charismatic signaling positively predicted 
views, regardless of whether we added measures of voice or nonverbal gesturing to the model (β 
= .02, p < .05). Note, the number of views were collected in June 2016 and all tests reported use 
this data. As a robustness check, we also estimated the model using the data we had initially 
gathered on the TED talks (i.e., March 2015); we also rechecked the estimates using more recent 
views (i.e., January 2018). The estimates, rounded, were precisely the same (i.e., β = .02, p < 
.01); this result is unsurprising given that the views in the three time periods correlated .99 
upwards. 
In terms of instrument strength, the Wald test (Sanderson & Windmeijer, 2016) for the 
excluded instruments in the first stage equation was highly significant Model 2 F(2, 196) =
117.92, 𝑝 <  .001, Model 3 F(2, 196) = 120.49, 𝑝 <  .001, and Model 4 F(3, 195) =
50.89, 𝑝 <  .001. Overidentifying restrictions were not rejected for the instrumental-variable 
Poisson model for Model 2 (Hansen J test 𝜒2(1) = 1.89, p = .17), Model 3 (Hansen J test 𝜒2(1) = 
.57, p = .45), and Model 4 (Hansen J test 𝜒2(1) = 80, p = .37); thus the models were correctly 
specified. However, given that obtaining fully unbiased estimates of nonverbal behavior was 
challenging and given that the estimate of verbal charisma did not change we can interpret 
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estimates from all models, though for the marginal effects we will use Model 3, which is the most 
objective one (ratings of charisma were on transcripts and were thus unaffected by the 
appearance of the target individuals). To better see the effect size, and for ease the interpretation 
of the Poisson regression coefficients, which are exponentiated, we computed predictive margins 
as a function of charismatic signaling scores. We found that using 10 more verbal charismatic 
signaling tactics increases the number of views by 21.41% on average (see Figure 2). 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Verbal charismatic signaling also predicted speakers being perceived as “inspiring” (β = 
.01, p < .01) regardless of controls entered; again overidentifying restrictions held: All 
overidentification test were non-significant (p > .10). Verbal charismatic signaling also predicted 
ratings of being seen as “persuasive” (β = .02, p < .01) irrespective of controls; however, because 
the overidentification test was rejected we used a different referent indicator (that acted as the 
scaling indicator for latent variable, which gave a non-significant overidentification test); thus, 
the results regarding persuasiveness should be interpreted with caution. See Tables 4a and 4b. 
Overall, these results provide partial support for Hypothesis 2.  
As for control variables, we found a highly significant effect of attractiveness on views, 
which is in line with previous research on facial cues and influence (Todorov, 2017). For 
instance, the difference in views for a person having been rated 1 SD below the mean compared 
to a person rated 1 SD deviation above the mean resulted in +72.85%  (i.e., 1,189,334 vs 
2,055,804 views). To put the verbal charisma effect into perspective 1 SD below the mean 
suggested 939,629.50 views; however, 1 SD above the mean suggested +163.77% more views 
(i.e., 2,478,429). Thus, the relative effect of verbal charisma was quite strong. Looking at average 
marginal effects, we also found that gesturing played no role, and notoriety mattered for views 
and persuasiveness. Interesting too, we found that speakers who had the low intensity variation 
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also had the highest number of views. As for the interaction, the relation between intensity and 
views was negative for low levels (-1SD from mean) of intensity (and flat for high levels, +1SD 
from mean, of intensity). As a robustness check, we examined the predictive power of an index of 
charismatic signaling (sum of verbal and nonverbal and instrumented by the separate verbal and 
non-verbal factors). Overall, results were not affected by much; the overidentification test was 
passed and the marginal effects were overall very similar.  
As a further check, and given we had some decent variation in length of talks, we 
included duration and number of characters in the talk as excluded instruments (included only in 
the first stage regression). These variables necessarily determine the upper bound of tactics 
delivered. Thus, we re-estimated Models 3 and 4 using this specification, as reported in Table 3, 
columns 6 and 7. All substantive results basically remained unchanged and the models were 
properly specified with instruments being very strong: 𝐹(4, 196) = 199.33, 𝑝 < .001 and 
𝐹(5, 195) = 36.23, 𝑝 < .001 respectively. Also, the overidentification tests were nonsignificant 
indicating they did not violate the exclusion restriction: Hansen J test 𝜒2(3) = 2.90 (p = .41 and 
Hansen J test 𝜒2(3) = 3.62 (p = .31) respectively. Note, given that the two instruments are highly 
correlated, (𝑟 = .90), leaving out number of characters did not alter the results (and instrument 
strength increased, 𝐹(3, 196) = 264.31, 𝑝 < .001 and 𝐹(4, 196) = 41.24, 𝑝 < .001); the 
specification worked too if we included characters as a control variable. 
The results of Study 1 generally support our hypotheses that verbal charismatic signaling 
increases social influence in a digital settings, even in the absence of formal leadership and that 
this signaling predicts prototypical adjectives associated with charismatic leaders. We found 
these results despite including very robust controls including nonverbal behaviors, looks, as well 
as many event and country-level control variables.  
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[Insert Tables 3, 4a and 4b about here] 
STUDY 2: TWITTER 
In Study 2, we used field data from Twitter (https://www.twitter.com). Twitter is a social 
network that allows users (i.e., tweeters) to write or share short text messages called tweets to an 
audience of subscribers (i.e. followers). Others can choose to follow the tweeter (and hence are 
denoted “follower”). The followers get to see the tweets of all the tweeters they follow; however 
tweets are visible to all Twitter subscribers if they search for particular terms or hashtags (i.e., 
trending term) or if they visit the tweeter’s page.  
A restrictive messaging policy applies and limits tweets to a maximum of 140 characters 
(at the time we gathered the data—this policy has recently been relaxed to allow for 280 
characters). As such, Twitter shares similarities with TED and supplies a standardized medium to 
test the effects of charismatic signaling on a measure of social influence. Twitter is a free service 
and a communication medium that is exclusively text-based (though a tweet can include images, 
video links, and other graphics). Thus, it provides a more difficult environment than does TED to 
test verbal charismatic signaling because followers are only exposed to verbal behaviors and this 
in a very terse information environment.   
Data and sample 
 
To maintain a manageable dataset and to ensure that statistical assumptions would be met 
for clustering due to nestings (cf. Cameron & Miller, 2015, who recommend at least n = 50 
clusters), we collected tweets from 60 individuals during a three-month timeframe. Because 
Twitter is often used for other purposes than sharing beliefs and preferences (e.g., individuals 
might use Twitter to share a location or a holiday picture), we narrowed our sample to two 
specific sub-groups of users (CEOs and politicians), which we assumed, used Twitter as a 
platform to gain social influence. The sample includes 30 CEOs and 30 members of the US 
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Congress (evenly distributed between Democrats and Republicans), chosen at random from 
publicly available lists and after excluding inactive Twitter accounts. Given the tradeoff between 
within and between sampling units, we randomly selected about 50 tweets from each tweeter 
resulting in a sample of 2,964 tweets nested under 60 tweeters; these sample sizes are large 
enough to ensure sufficient power for phenomena having medium effects (Scherbaum & Ferreter, 
2009). Note that we selected our tweets from a specific timeframe; as such we keep constant any 
events and situations that could have had an influence on followers’ attributional processes (cf. 
Jacquart and Antonakis, 2015). By drawing tweets from the same time-frame, we ruled out the 
effect a specific event may have had on the number of retweets (e.g., tweets on 9/11 may trigger 
more retweets than tweets on a regular Tuesday morning). Because of the network policy that 
applied on Twitter at the time of the data collection (i.e., in December 2011), the maximum 
number of shares (i.e. retweets) displayed was limited to 100 with tweets receiving more than a 
100 tweets being displayed as “100+”. By constraining the variation of the dependent variable, 
the estimate is more conservative than if the number of retweets had a greater variation. Tweets 
with strictly more than 100 retweets were coded as 100 (though we do make a provision for the 
censuring effect by also estimating the model using Tobit regression).  
Note, even though nowadays Twitter reports the precise number of retweets of tweets, it 
makes no sense for us to attempt to use the data on the actual retweets today because we would 
model conditions that were not experienced by users at that time. A tweet with say 550 retweets 
or a tweet with 102 retweets was seen as the same by all users (i.e., 100+). The probability of a 
“bandwagon” effect—that individuals may tend to retweet a highly popular tweet—was not 
present for those seeing the tweet and the precise number of retweets. Thus, because all tweets 
over 100 retweets were treated in the same way at that time, it is logical too for us to analyze the 





We collected the number of shares (i.e., retweets) as a proxy for social influence. 
Retweets or shares are costly not only in terms of time and energy but also because of the 
reputational cost associated to the action of sharing someone else’s tweet. Like in Study 1, it is 
fair to assume that users of Twitter share a tweet if they have been inspired or convinced by its 
content.  
Independent variables and controls 
 
 Charismatic signaling. We operationalized charismatic signaling using the same nine 
verbal behaviors as in Study 1. Again, three trained raters (Coder A, B, and C) coded the entire 
dataset and reached a standardized alpha reliability coefficient of .74. Two out of three raters 
were the same as in Study 1. Pairwise measures of agreement between coders A, B and C are 
77.50%, 80.09% and 79.89 and pairwise Cohen’s kappa (pairwise agreement corrected for 
chance effects) are .38 (SE = .02, z = 23.11, p < .001), .43 (SE = .02, z = 27.40, p < .001) and .34 
(SE = .02, z = 20.24, p < .001). Raters coded each tweet for the presence of each of the nine 
verbal charismatic tactics using binary measures (0, 1); we summed the number of instances to 
derive the charismatic signaling score at the tweet level. We also averaged the number of 
charismatic signaling tactics by author to capture the individual fixed effect of being charismatic; 
the cluster means capture the constant or average effect of a tweeter, thus modeling the mean 
difference in y due to the tweeter. Including the cluster means thus ensure that the estimator is 
consistent (Antonakis, Bastardoz, & Rönkkö, 2019; McNeish & Kelley, 2018). In our 
specification we therefore included two variables: A first one that measures how many 
charismatic signaling tactics a focal individual uses on average (the contextual effect) and a 
second one that measures how many charismatic signaling tactics are used in a specific tweet (the 
within effect, Antonakis et al., 2019). Note, given that the raters were not the same as in Study 1, 
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as a robustness check we validated the coding by using a deep-learning algorithm to 
automatically code the tweets; this algorithm was trained on the coded data from Study 1 
(Garner, Bornet, Loupi, Antonakis, & Rohner, 2019). The raw coded Twitter data (on all the 
tweet content) using the algorithm and at the Tweeter level correlated strongly, r = .59, p < .0001 
with the average of the coders (who on average correlated r = .64 with each other). 
 Control variables. We include two types of control variables: Variables about the author, 
and variables about the tweet. We controlled for individual differences between authors by 
including sex (male = 1, female = 0), whether the sender was a politician or CEO (politician = 1, 
else = 0), a republican (=1, else = 0), and the number of people following the author on the day.  
We also controlled for tweet level characteristics and included the number of mentions (i.e. @id) 
and hashtags (i.e. #id), in case they increased the prospective readership. Other control variables 
include the use of links to other websites within the tweet, citing a press article, using videos or 
pictures within the tweet, the number of days since the tweet was published (and its quadratic 
effect to capture decay over time), and whether the tweet refers to another author’s tweet 
(whether modified or retweeted). Finally, we adopted Golbeck, Grimes, and Rogers’s (2010) 
method to code for the intention of the tweet of congressman and congresswomen (e.g., request 
for action, direct communication, providing information, etc.), with a slight adaptation of their 
categorization to accommodate the particularities of corporate communication in CEO tweets.   
Estimation method  
As in Study 1 we used an instrumental-variable Poisson regression model (iterated GMM) 
for the main model; we instrumented the charismatic signaling scores of coder A with the scores 
of coders B and C to account for measurement error. Because we had panel data within the 
tweeter (j) level (i.e. in terms of tweets and time-varying predictors), as mentioned, alongside all 
the time-varying control (ij) variables, we included their cluster means, as we did with the mean 
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tweet level (see Mundlak, 1978, for proof of the consistency of this estimator). Doing so added 
18 more control variables to the model (in addition to the time-varying 18 controls and the three 
j-level predictors, female, politician, and republican)—thus, we include k = 39 control variables 
in the regression model.  We also estimated the variance using cluster-robust standard errors and 
used other estimators as robustness checks. We estimated the following model:  
First stage:                   
𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 =  𝛿𝑗 + 𝛿1𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿2𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘𝑗
39
𝑘=1
+ 𝑢   
 
(5) 
Second stage:               𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑘𝑗
39
𝑘=1
+ 𝑒 (6) 
   
 
The data we have made it difficult to estimate the model while accounting for all the nuances 
simultaneously, that is, having panel count data, an endogenous regressor, as well as censuring 
(lower and upper bound). Thus, we will perform robustness checks using other estimators.  
Results 
 Means, standard deviations and correlations are reported in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
We display the results of our hierarchical regression analysis in Table 6. For the instrumental-
variable Poisson estimator, again, the instruments were strong in the first stage: 𝜒2(4) = 633.74 , 
p < .001. Overidentifying restrictions were not rejected, with Hansen J test 𝜒2 (2) = .34, p = .84. 
The charisma score at the tweet level, the within effect, did not predict retweets; however, the 
charisma cluster mean did (β = 3.85, p < .001). Thus, how charismatic an author is on average, 
the between effect (i.e., the within plus contextual effect, as estimated by the linear combination 
of estimators, β = 3.83, p < .001), positively predicts retweets. This result, insofar as only the 
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average effect is concerned, supports Hypothesis 1. Holding constant the individual tweets, an 
author that increases the average proportion of charismatic signaling tactics in tweets from 
16.64% to 29.66% (+ 1 SD) increases the number of retweets from 3.31 to 5.46, that is, by 
64.96% (see Figure 3). It is important to point out that confidence intervals increase substantially 
for authors who have an average proportion of charismatic signaling tactics of 36% or more 
tactics because most tweets use no or one charismatic tactic. At the individual tweet level, and 
using from Coder A, 73.95% used zero tactics, 22.77% tweets used one tactic, 2.97% tweets used 
two tactics, .27% tweets used three tactics, and .03% tweets used four tactics. Of course, it is 
difficult to show more than one tactic given the maximum number of characters imposed by 
Twitter at that time. As a comparable measure of effect to the results in the Study 1, going from -
1 to +1 SD from the mean of the average proportion of charismatic leadership tactics used by an 
author increased retweets +172.11%. Thus, this effect is substantively similar to the one found in 
Study 1. However, given the censuring, we also examined how the results held up when using 
other estimators. 
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 3 about here] 
We present results first using a two-stage least squares model (2SLS); given the censuring 
both at the lower (0) and upper (100) limit, it is interesting to compare the 2SLS estimate to the 
instrumental-variable Tobit (IV-Tobit) estimate. The difference between the two estimates is 
rather substantial. 2SLS suggests that a change in one unit of the average proportion of 
charismatic leadership tactics used by an author produces 31.82 retweets; however, the IV-Tobit 
estimate is 40.41 retweets (i.e., 46.89% higher). 
DISCUSSION 
We investigated the effect of charismatic signaling on social influence in the absence of a 
formal leadership role and this in a digital setting, where the leaders are not seen face to face 
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(TED) or not usually seen at all (Twitter). The implications of our findings are important for 
leadership researchers for several reasons. First, we found that charismatic signaling increases 
measures of social influence, as identified with TED views and ratings as well as Twitter 
retweets, in the context of social media. For the latter, the level of charisma in an individual tweet 
did not matter. Perhaps we did not have sufficient power at the within level to detect this effect or 
perhaps one tweet per se is insufficient to move individuals given the terse information 
environment. However, how charismatic a Tweeter is on average has a very strong effect, 
underscoring the importance of between-leader differences in charismatic signaling. The effects 
were robust and practically important. In the case of Twitter, our results underscore the impact 
that charismatic signaling can have even in a very frugal electronic communication medium.  
As for the case of TED the interesting finding is that verbal charisma has a very strong 
effect on views and this even beyond nonverbal charisma and attractiveness. Our results, 
particularly with respect to attractiveness are aligned with evidence reported by some recent work 
on charisma (Tskhay, et al., 2017; Tskhay, et al., 2018). However, it is important to bear in mind 
that Antonakis et al. (2011) did control for leader fixed-effects (which included looks, clothes, 
topic or other constant effects at the leader level; see their Study 2). Thus, these results are 
encouraging given we directly partialled out the effects of attractiveness—although observers 
appear to be biased by the attractiveness of a speaker, given the importance of charisma in 
predicting views, observers must have updated their initial classification on the basis of how 
much charisma the speaker signaled (i.e., observers individuated the target as a function of verbal 
charismatic signaling). Moreover, that verbal charisma did predict outcomes in the TED context, 
and nonverbal charisma did not, also adds to the literature by shining a different light on the 
suggestion that most important element of interpersonal communication is nonverbal. Moreover, 
previous literature has shown nonverbal behavior to be a reasonably good proxy of certain traits 
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or to be predictive of particular outcomes; however, as concerns the latter, such research did not 
control for verbal charismatic signaling, whose measurement and manipulation has only been 
recently introduced to the literature. The verbal aspect seems to have a particular strong effect on 
leadership outcomes. We hope that future research examines this issue further.  
Second, our findings add to the literature on effects of charismatic signaling in informal 
leadership contexts via digital means. Both the TED and Twitter platforms did not involve an 
institutionalized form of leadership and the consequence of leader charisma was experienced 
virtually by the followers. Also, the individuals sending tweets or delivering TED talks could not 
use coercive or reward mechanisms, nor did they bear a formal title or status as a leader to 
enforce shares and views of their message (Koslowsky, et al., 2001). We can assume that the act 
of following in this context is mostly voluntary for most cases. Although theorized by leadership 
scholars, our findings are to our knowledge, the first to provide empirical evidence that using 
charismatic signaling can increase social influence and contribute to the leader emergence and 
this from a distance via electronic communication channels.  
Although our results provide evidence that social media influencers can use charismatic 
signaling to promote their cause, it is not clear yet whether formal and informal leadership are 
moderators of the effect of charismatic signaling on social influence. Perhaps past research on the 
moderating effects of leader distance and charisma can provide some insights (Howell & Shamir, 
2005). The context that we studied does set the leader far from observers, suggesting that the 
latter have less tangible or intimate information on the leader. In other words, observers have less 
behavioral information about the leader and they cannot observe the leader’s actions in unstaged 
settings. Thus, it is possible that leaders’ signals from distant, digital settings play a larger role in 
classifying leaders and inferring their qualities than they would in closer situations, where 
observers can use more individuating information.  
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Fourth, we contributed to the literature by providing a strong test of the markers of 
charisma in a controlled setting; beyond freeing the data from the confound of formal leadership, 
the standardized settings in which we examined charisma’s effects should provide further 
evidence of its importance in other, more general settings where influence is involved. As such, 
we hope that this evidence will add to the existing body of knowledge (Antonakis, et al., 2011; 
Jacquart & Antonakis, 2015; Meslec, et al., 2020; Towler, 2003) and contribute to further 
development of objective measures of charisma. As we argued before, archival data of this sort 
should be preferred, when possible, to perceptual measures to avoid various endogeneity biases.  
Our work also makes a contribution by extending the use of objectively-measured 
charismatic signaling to written communication. That we can measure charisma’s impact directly 
in text-based communication, and this independent from nonverbal signals, suggests new 
research avenues should be explored. For instance, there are troves of public speeches available 
on top-level leaders like CEOs, country presidents, or politicians and thus many questions to 
answer about the impact of charisma on institutional policies or country-level outcomes (e.g., 
whether citizens follow government suggestions for physical distancing in the Covid-19 
outbreak).  
In this article, we have used different coders in Study 1 and Study 2. Although it may alter 
the comparability between the two studies because of individual differences in coding, the 
strength of the results in both studies illustrate how individuals can be trained to code verbal 
charismatic with a high degree of consistency. Of course, in an era of accessible big data taking 
this research to the next level will require the automatic coding of charismatic signals by 
computer; deep neural networks (using machine learning) could be very useful in this regard 
(LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015). A recent software demonstration shows that the tactics can be 
reliably coded by computer (Garner, et al., 2019), as also seen in the robustness check of Study 2.  
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Finally, if replicated, our results have also implications for training: Because charismatic 
signaling affects social influence for individuals without formal leadership positions in digital 
settings, we suggest that trainings on charismatic signaling should be directed not only to leaders 
but to a broader base of individuals and even to those who exercise influence but are not thought 
of as leaders (e.g., teachers, doctors, public policy experts), whether operating on-line or not. 
Interestingly, although TED speaker receive coaching and training, we assume on the secrets of 
great talks (Anderson, 2016; Gallo, 2014), it seems that the organization does not provide much 
training in charisma, as we have operationalized it.  
Beyond the importance for contexts for social media contexts, of course, there are 
implications too for informal influence in economic or social settings including for those who 
have to (a) influence individuals at the interface of their organizations like shareholders or 
partners, (b) promote an idea or a message such as entrepreneurs pitching their start-up to venture 
capitalists, (c) convince a broader population to partake in public good efforts, as in the case of 
recycling or sustainability efforts, (d) conduct fundraising for important causes, and (e) 
communicate scientific findings to a broad audience.  
As concerns the last point it is important to note that about 28% of the TED talks we 
analyzed were given by professors, and another 8% were given by medical practitioners or 
engineers. Individuals, who wish to increase their impact inside and outside institutions, as well 
as between institutions, should consider using charismatic signaling as an additional means to 
gain social influence and emerge as opinion leaders when using social media. The importance of 
scientists engaging a larger audience and influencing public debate is currently seen as a very 
important endeavor (Côté & Darling, 2018), especially the ability to use effective story-telling 






Although the two studies provide some evidence for our hypotheses, there are several 
limitations that should be considered. Both studies use field data; despite thorough consideration 
about endogeneity issues, our results might be affected by omitted variables. For instance, it is 
not clear to us how talks are promoted by TED; if talks that are more charismatic are more 
heavily promoted then our estimates for charisma are overstated. Still, that the effect of charisma 
may possibly be built into promotion algorithms of TED highlights its importance. However, 
recall too also that the verbal charisma scores in the TED database were rather normally 
distributed; thus, speakers were neither selected on these scores nor probably trained to increase 
them. If speakers were selected or trained, the distribution would be negatively skewed with a 
high mean and low standard deviation (yet we observed the opposite in the data when not 
conditioning on the controls, and a normal distribution when we do). That we find essentially the 
same results when using talk length as instrumental variables gives us some confidence in the 
findings.   
Still, other individual differences (e.g., intelligence) might affect views too; however, if 
charisma is an honest signal then at least from a predictive framework results are policy relevant. 
That is, having knowledge of someone’s charisma provides decent probabilistic information of 
their influence in on-line settings (cf. Kleinberg, Ludwig, Mullainathan, & Obermeyer, 2015). 
Nonetheless to obtain an unbiased and causally interpretable effect size, future research should 
test similar hypotheses in settings where randomization of charisma can be undertaken in more 
controlled platform, both for TED-type and Twitter-type contexts. Recent results in incentivized 
field and laboratory settings though do show a important causal effect of charisma on worker 
performance or in helping solve coordination problems in groups (Antonakis, d’Adda, Weber, & 
Zehnder, 2020; Meslec, et al., 2020); such designs, as well as those harnessing exogenous shocks 
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in the context of a natural experiment (Sieweke & Santoni, 2020) or manipulating charisma and 
determining how its effect is channeled (Sajons, 2020) would be particularly useful.  
Another limitation concerns our choice of the dependent variables; views and retweets 
might not be the best proxies for social influence. The use of “inspiring” or “persuasive” ratings 
as an alternative dependent variable provide some preliminary answers to this question;  
however, future investigation might include more straightforward measures of social influence, 
especially in the realm of observed behavior or institutional-level outcomes.   
In addition, although we have argued that we have observed leadership in informal 
settings it is unclear to what extent individuals having a hierarchical relationship with the leader 
affected the dependent measure (e.g., hierarchical subordinates, colleagues, or friends of leaders 
on Twitter who retweet what is tweeted by the leader). This issue can also extend to authors or 
speakers who benefit from a fan base. We did attempt to partial out this factor in the case of TED 
(by including a measure of notoriety, the length of the Wikipedia page). In the case of Twitter we 
did control for number of followers, whose fixed-effect was very significant. Still, this limitation 
“goes against us” in that it will attenuate our findings (i.e., if individuals close to the leader 
reliably retweet his or her tweets, or promote their TED videos, then there will be a ceiling effect 
present for the case of that leader and the charismatic tactics will less likely be predictive of 
influence for that leader). Moreover, although the data we coded may not have been conceived by 
the person delivering it—meaning we measure the charisma of the speech writer—this limitation 
does not hamper what claims we can make, given the unit of analysis is the speech per se and its 
impact. Thus, to the eyes of the person exposed to the charisma, the person delivering it gets the 
credit. 
Finally, we do not know, yet, the precise mechanism through which charismatic signaling 
engenders the charismatic effect. Although some “toy models” do provide some insights 
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(Antonakis, et al., 2020), more basic research and theory development is required before we can 
build a more complete picture.   
Conclusion 
  
Our results provide initial evidence that verbal charismatic signaling determines influence 
success in informal leadership settings such as in social media. Indeed, our results bring to light 
the importance of viewing leadership as a social influence process rather than a position, where 
following and according status to the leader is voluntary; the context of social media, where there 
is no formal authority, but where charismatic signaling still had an effect allows us to make this 
claim. Still, the effect of charisma works in similar ways regardless of whether it occurs in formal 
and informal leadership settings.  
Whereas TV, newspapers, books, or scientific articles formed the battlefield of ideas and 
aspiring leaders in the past, today things work rather differently. Increasingly, social media is 
becoming a dominant playfield, even triggering unforeseen collective action (Margetts, John, 
Hale, & Yasseri, 2015). Individuals who once granted power by casting a vote or attributing 
status are now turning to social media to grant power to leaders in the form of likes and shares. 
Eschewing the importance of social media will not make them go away. Recent White House 
residents have all complemented traditional means of communication by also directly engaging 
with followers on Twitter, with Donald Trump taking it to a whole new level. Other country 
presidents and politicians (e.g., Emmanuel Macron, Justin Trudeau, Ursula von der Leyen) also 
use Twitter regularly. Although seen as the province of politicians, celebrities, and CEOs, social 
media is an important channel that activists, writers, and even scientists too (who were well 
represented in the TED sphere), should consider using more.   
“Knowledge is power” the saying goes, and because social media gives an unprecedented 
tool to diffuse ideas, political positions, and values, understating how individuals can secure 
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informal leadership in the digital knowledge market place is both relevant and important for 
theory and practice alike. As mentioned by Galetti and Costa-Pereira “In a world of “alternative 
facts,” a powerful voice—[a TED talk] or tweet [or media briefing]—can help to improve the 
communication gap between scientists and the public” (2017, p. 881). Misinformation in social 
media is highly problematic and the failsafe way to fight it is “to harness the same sophisticated 
tools in the name of science that are being used to tear science down” (Thorp, 2020, p. 1405). 
Ironically, the importance of charismatic communication by leaders in the digital sphere, 
especially about public health policy, is now even more visible in the Corona fog.  
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TABLE 1: Definitions and operationalizations of charisma 
 
 
Element of definition 
 
Example works  
Typical 
operationalization 
Useful for causal 
explanations  
Implications for training 
Gift, ability, extraordinary 
quality 
 
(Etzioni, 1961; Shils, 





No; not scientific None 
Defined in terms of 
leadership “style” 
 
(Bass & Avolio, 1995; De 
Hoogh, Den Hartog, & 
Koopman, 2004; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & 
Bommer, 1996; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 





Mostly no; overexposed to 
endogeneity bias and other 
methodological issues 
(difficult to manipulate 
directly or to find the right 
instrumental variables) 
Few (e.g., difficult to 
develop policy around 
general statements like 
“appear more inspiring” 
or “come across as more 
powerful”) 




(Jacquart & Antonakis, 
2015; Jensen et al., 2020; 
Mio, et al., 2005) 
 
Archival data or 
direct observation 
Mostly yes; provided 
appropriate statistical 
controls are employed 
Yes; specific tactics are 
trainable  




(Antonakis, et al., 2011, 
2012; Frese, et al., 2003; 
Howell & Frost, 1989; 






Yes; specific tactics are 
trainable 
     





Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Views 1.64E+06 3.22E+06                  
2. Inspiring .18 .10 .18                 
3. Persuasive .09 .07 -.04 .10                
4. Male .62 .49 -.18 -.16 .07               
5. Attractive 4.11 1.10 .13 .12 -.09 -.33              
6. Wearing red .11 .31 .05 -.14 .03 -.11 .03             
7. Verbal charisma A  44.57 25.00 .21 .21 .26 .11 -.15 -.18            
8. Verbal charisma B  36.40 21.06 .21 .18 .28 .10 -.17 -.13 .92           
9. Verbal charisma C  28.76 15.93 .15 .16 .32 .10 -.16 -.13 .88 .88          
10. Gestures A 1.43 1.04 .30 .09 -.03 -.15 .18 .00 .17 .17 .17         
11. Gestures B 1.37 .74 .18 .14 .01 .00 .06 -.04 .24 .24 .19 .69        
12. Pitch 185.99 107.11 .06 .05 .07 -.28 .02 .03 .06 .14 .13 .28 .17       
13. Pitch SD 51.10 16.41 .11 .04 -.04 -.37 .12 .08 -.06 -.08 -.03 .28 .21 .25      
14. Intense 70.32 4.20 .04 .05 -.06 .05 .08 .00 .17 .09 .18 -.04 -.09 .03 .01     
15. Intense SD 13.27 5.07 -.03 .07 .01 .05 -.02 .18 -.12 -.10 -.10 -.06 -.09 -.02 -.07 .00    
16. Log GDP  10.71 .57 .06 -.07 -.04 -.05 .10 -.05 .14 .13 .15 .04 .08 .02 .15 .02 -.05   
17. Log Pop 18.81 1.07 .07 .05 -.13 -.02 -.04 .00 .12 .10 .07 .00 .00 .05 .05 .21 .00 -.09  
18. Wikipedia  2672.00 4772.39 .06 .17 .19 .13 -.04 -.05 .22 .20 .22 -.05 -.03 -.10 -.05 .13 -.05 .06 .06 
19. TEDx .19 .39 .00 -.06 .04 -.13 .02 .04 -.05 -.02 .01 -.07 .01 .17 .03 -.07 -.03 .07 -.09 
20. Minutes 13.82 5.32 .14 .05 .18 .10 -.12 -.09 .74 .71 .68 .08 .06 .00 .00 .15 -.12 .10 .06 
21. Months  58.46 28.09 -.02 -.10 -.01 .24 -.18 -.07 .38 .40 .34 -.06 -.01 -.13 -.19 .04 -.08 .07 .18 
22. Months
2
  4203.66 3641.70 -.04 -.08 -.04 .25 -.17 -.06 .39 .40 .35 -.07 -.03 -.15 -.18 .15 -.07 .06 .19 
                    
 







18 19 20 21 
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1. Views     
2. Inspiring     
3. Persuasive     
4. Male     
5. Attractive     
6. Wearing red     
7. Charisma A      
8. Charisma B      
9. Charisma C      
10. Gestures A     
11. Gestures B     
12. Pitch     
13. Pitch SD     
14. Intense     
15. Intense SD     
16. Log GDP      
17. Log Pop     
18. Wikipedia      
19. TEDx -.13    
20. Minutes .30 -.02   
21. Months  .21 -.25 .34  
22. Months
2
  .24 -.26 .36 .98 
     
 
Note. n = 240; correlations greater than |.16| are significant at p < .01; correlations greater than |.12| are significant at p < .05; correlations greater than .10 are 
significant at p < .10.   
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TABLE 3: Estimates predicting views (Study 1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables Views Views Views Views Views Views Views 
Attractive .23*** .25*** .24*** .20*** .24*** .25*** .18*** 
 (3.68) (4.41) (3.69) (2.72) (4.57) (5.18) (2.73) 
Male -.22 -.15 -.02 -.09 -.03 -.00 -.08 
 (1.35) (1.16) (.12) (.62) (.24) (.02) (.61) 
Wiki. page .00 .00* .00** .00*** .00*** .00*** .00*** 
 (1.50) (1.92) (2.24) (2.84) (2.91) (2.81) (3.33) 
Duration .06 .00 -.00 .02 -.00   
 (1.44) (.02) (.04) (.49) (.04)   
Months old .02 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
 (1.40) (.77) (.71) (1.04) (1.05) (.77) (.89) 
Months old2 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00* -.00* -.00 -.00 
 (1.45) (1.25) (1.35) (1.67) (1.87) (1.36) (1.40) 
Log GDP -.06 -.10 -.09 -.09 -.13 -.15 -.10 
 (.50) (.95) (.84) (.79) (1.38) (1.62) (1.10) 
Log Pop. .02 -.02 .01 -.01 -.02 -.03 -.02 
 (.22) (.36) (.12) (.10) (.32) (.59) (.39) 
TEDx -.31 -.59** -.66*** -.62** -.73*** -.65*** -.55*** 
 (.90) (2.46) (3.26) (2.41) (3.80) (3.21) (2.73) 
Verb. charisma 
 
.02*** .02*** .02**  .02*** .01*** 
 
 
(2.97) (3.01) (2.52)  (6.87) (3.94) 
Pitch mean (A)   .01 .01 .01 .01** .01** 
   (.96) (1.07) (.83) (2.03) (2.01) 
Pitch SD (B)   .03 .03* .03* .05*** .04*** 
   (1.64) (1.74) (1.65) (2.69) (2.65) 
A*B   -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00** -.00** 
   (1.11) (1.36) (1.15) (2.29) (2.41) 
Intense mean (C)   -.16*** -.19*** -.22*** -.23*** -.20*** 
   (3.17) (2.79) (4.24) (4.22) (3.15) 
Intense SD (D)   -.92*** -1.17*** -1.30*** -1.34*** -1.19*** 
   (3.06) (3.27) (4.42) (4.15) (3.49) 
C*D   .01*** .02*** .02*** .02*** .02*** 
   (3.11) (3.24) (4.35) (4.09) (3.47) 
Gesturing    .13   .20 
    (.75)   (1.46) 
Charisma index     .02***   
     (5.61)   
Constant 12.33*** 14.02*** 23.58*** 26.47*** 29.72*** 29.64*** 26.36*** 
 (4.17) (6.52) (5.18) (3.96) (6.59) (6.24) (4.72) 
Pseudo R-squared 
(McFadden) .58 
. . . 
   
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10; Note. All controls included in all models. 
Model 1 estimated with a Poisson regression; Models 2 to 5 estimated with an instrumented variable Poisson 
regression; Estimates are unstandardized.  n = 240 observations. Models 4, 5, 6, and 7 are provided as a 
robustness checks and for interest only. Given that Poisson estimates are exponentiated and not directly 
interpreted, underlined estimates indicate average marginal effects that are significant at p = .05 or less.   
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TABLE 4a: Estimates predicting adjective inspiring (Study 1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Inspiring Inspiring Inspiring Inspiring Inspiring 
Attractive -.01 .01 -.00 -.01 -.00 
 (.21) (.16) (.02) (.21) (.08) 
Male -.27** -.26** -.28** -.29*** -.28*** 
 (2.31) (2.52) (2.57) (2.58) (2.60) 
Wiki page .00*** .00*** .00*** .00*** .00*** 
 (3.15) (3.20) (3.07) (3.05) (3.06) 
Duration -.00 -.01 -.03 -.03 -.03 
 (.19) (.96) (1.56) (1.61) (1.58) 
Months old -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 .01 
 (.89) (.87) (.94) (.95) (.94) 
Months old2 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
 (.41) (.15) (.38) (.39) (.38) 
Log GDP -.14* -.17** -.13* -.13* -.13* 
 (1.77) (2.37) (1.95) (1.73) (1.93) 
Log Population .03 .02 .02 .02 .02 
 (.61) (.44) (.47) (.54) (.50) 
TEDx -.22 -.20 -.18 -.16 -.17 
 (1.58) (1.64) (1.37) (1.18) (1.33) 
Verbal charisma  .01*** .01*** .01***  
  (3.60) (3.22) (2.70)  
Pitch mean   .00 .00 .00 
   (.43) (.38) (.41) 
Pitch SD   .01 .01 .01 
   (.63) (.59) (.62) 
Pitch mean* Pitch SD   -.00 -.00 -.00 
   (.52) (.53) (.52) 
Intensity mean   .04 .05 .04 
   (.83) (.90) (.86) 
Intensity SD   .27 .30 .28 
   (1.11) (1.16) (1.14) 
Intensity mean* Intensity SD   -.00 -.00 -.00 
   (.98) (1.03) (1.01) 
Gesturing    .04  
    (.44)  
Charisma index     .01*** 
     (3.44) 
Constant .15 .47 -3.61 -4.12 -3.75 
 (.10) (.33) (.84) (.91) (.88) 
R-squared .28 .33 .35 .35 .35 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10; Note. All controls included in all models. 
Model 1 is estimated with OLS regression; Models 2 to 5 estimated with two-stage least squares regression. 
Because the dependent variables are bounded they are logit transformed. Models 4 and 5 provided as a 




TABLE 4b: Estimates predicting adjective persuasive (Study 1) 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive Persuasive 
Attractive -.05 -.03 -.04 .01 -.04 
 (.83) (.49) (.70) (.25) (.80) 
Male -.03 -.02 -.07 -.01 -.07 
 (.25) (.16) (.51) (.11) (.53) 
Wiki page .00** .00** .00** .00** .00** 
 (2.30) (2.57) (2.44) (1.99) (2.45) 
Duration -.02 -.03 -.04 -.02 -.04 
 (.53) (1.12) (1.29) (.93) (1.25) 
Months old .03*** .03*** .03*** .03*** .03*** 
 (3.14) (3.42) (3.17) (3.25) (3.16) 
Months old2 -.00*** -.00*** -.00*** -.00*** -.00*** 
 (3.75) (4.16) (3.63) (3.81) (3.61) 
Log GDP -.02 -.05 -.03 -.08 -.03 
 (.20) (.58) (.36) (.92) (.30) 
Log Population -.03 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.03 
 (.49) (.80) (.68) (.81) (.64) 
TEDx .05 .08 .13 .00 .14 
 (.35) (.58) (1.00) (.02) (1.03) 
Verbal charisma  .02*** .02*** .02***  
  (3.68) (3.43) (3.74)  
Pitch mean   -.01* -.01* -.01* 
   (1.89) (1.79) (1.90) 
Pitch SD   -.02** -.02* -.02** 
   (2.00) (1.78) (2.02) 
Pitch mean* Pitch SD   .00* .00* .00* 
   (1.95) (1.90) (1.96) 
Intensity mean   .09 .05 .09 
   (1.50) (.99) (1.58) 
Intensity SD   .49 .33 .51* 
   (1.58) (1.12) (1.65) 
Intensity mean* Intensity SD   -.01 -.00 -.01 
   (1.52) (1.09) (1.59) 
Gesturing    -.17**  
    (2.02)  
Charisma index     .01*** 
     (3.16) 
Constant -3.97** -3.56** -9.06* -6.16 -9.46 
 (2.18) (2.21) (1.95) (1.35) (2.03) 
R-squared .34 .36 .38 .41 .38 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10; Note. All controls included in all models. 
Model 5 is estimated with OLS regression; Models 6 to 9 estimated with two-stage least squares regression. 
Because the dependent variables are bounded they are logit transformed. Models 4 and 5 provided as a 




Table 5: Correlation Matrix of Key Variables (Study 2) 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Retweets 6.17 16.22 
   
 
            
  
2. Male .76 .42 .02 
  
 
            
  
3. Politician .51 .50 -.08 -.31 
 
 
            
  
4. Republican .25 .43 -.02 -.22 .58                
5. Followers 16.65 43.47 .48 .16 -.23 -.05 
            
  
6.Charisma AF .30 .13 .19 .01 -.12 -.31 .03              
7.Charisma BF .19 .15 .13 .06 .12 -.35 -.06 .65             
8.Charisma CF .21 .11 .05 -.11 .40 .00 -.17 .67 .59            
9. Charisma A .30 .54 .03 -.00 -.03 -.07 .01 .24 .16 .16 
        
  
10. Charisma B .19 .46 .04 .02 .04 -.11 -.02 .21 .32 .19 .54 
       
  
11. Charisma C .21 .44 .02 -.03 .10 .00 -.04 .16 .14 .24 .49 .41 
      
  
12. @ mentions  .64 .96 -.09 .05 -.15 -.09 .07 -.01 .00 -.11 -.02 .00 -.04 
     
  
13. Hashtags  .50 .90 -.02 -.06 .23 .25 -.09 -.04 -.04 .12 -.02 -.02 .01 -.01 
    
  
14. Links .53 .52 .09 -.03 .18 .22 -.01 -.08 -.08 .01 -.01 -.03 .04 -.17 .03 
   
  
15. Press .06 .23 .01 .08 .02 -.05 -.04 -.09 -.04 -.07 -.04 -.02 -.02 -.06 -.06 .22 
  
  
16. Picture .08 .27 -.01 -.15 .11 .11 .03 -.07 -.09 -.02 -.01 -.01 .00 -.08 .00 .25 -.07 
 
  
17. Video .03 .18 -.01 -.03 .08 .09 -.04 -.01 -.02 .03 .01 .00 .03 -.01 .08 .15 -.03 -.04   
18. Days old 43.98 25.49 .01 -.00 .01 .02 -.05 .07 .02 .05 .02 .02 .04 -.03 -.02 .03 .01 .00 -.04  
19. Retweet .06 .24 -.07 -.01 -.02 .00 -.05 .02 .02 -.01 .01 .00 -.02 .31 .03 .01 .01 -.04 .04 -.01 
 
Note. n= 2,964 observations. Number of followers is in thousands. We do not indicate significance levels for the correlations given that the data are 
nested (at the ij level); thus, the t-statistic assumption of independence of observations is violated. Subscript F denotes fixed-effects (i.e., using 
cluster means).  
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TABLE 6: Estimates (Study 2) 
 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Step 1       
Male -.46* -.31 -2.19 -1.99 -4.60 -4.38 
 
(1.74) (1.09) (.97) (.86) (1.35) (1.21) 
Politician .23 .31 .30 -.43 1.49 .25 
 
(.59) (1.09) (.10) (.16) (.34) (.06) 
Republican -1.57*** .31 -5.42* .18 -1.21** -1.58 
 (3.77) (1.09) (1.98) (.05) (2.49) (.27) 
Followers  -.01* -.01* -.07 -.07 -.41 -.38 
 
(1.75) (1.88) (.17) (.17) (.74) (.70) 
Days old .01 .01* .07 .07* .10 .10 
 
(1.63) (1.80) (1.63) (1.67) (1.46) (1.49) 
Days old
2
  -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 
 
(1.22) (1.34) (1.20) (1.22) (.95) (.97) 
FollowersF  .03*** .03*** .26 .25 .68 .63 
 
(4.44) (4.54) (.72) (.66) (1.27) (1.18) 
Days oldF  -.00 -.12* -.01 -.44 -.03 -.80 
 
(.00) (1.89) (.01) (.85) (.04) (.98) 
Days old
2
F  .00 .00** .00 .00 .00 .01 
 
(.74) (2.29) (.17) (.55) (.21) (.70) 
       
Controls Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
ControlsF Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
       
Constant 4.76*** 4.89*** 9.37 8.48 24.01* 23.77* 
 
(4.18) (4.42) (1.21) (1.14) (1.74) (1.69) 
       
Step 2       
CharismaF   3.85***  31.82**  48.22*** 
 
 (3.75)  (2.53)  (2.61) 
Charisma   -.01  -.00  .34 
  (.21)  (.01)  (.35) 
       
R-squared   .35 .36   
 
Cluster-robust z-statistics in parentheses; ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10; Subscript F denotes fixed-
effect (using cluster mean). Model 1 estimated with a Poisson regression; Model 2 estimated with an 
instrumental variable Poisson regression. Models 3 estimated with OLS. Model 4 estimated with 
two-stage least squares. Model 5 estimated with a Tobit (including upper, 100, and lower, 0 limits). 
Model 6 estimated with an instrumental-variable Tobit estimator. Estimates are unstandardized. n = 
2,964, clustered at N = 60. Given that Poisson estimates are exponentiated and not directly 




FIGURE 1: Distribution of Charisma Scores of TED speakers 
 
Note: Vertical line corresponds to the mean: Graph on right is the predicted value conditioned on all the control variables.  
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FIGURE 2: Effects of Charismatic Signaling Tactics on TED views 
 
 















Appendix I: Reanalysis Antonakis et al. (2011) data by splitting verbal and nonverbal charismatic signaling 














Original results reported in Antonakis et al. (2011)             
Charismatic signaling  5.78** 3.53** 2.80* 5.31** 4.56** 4.01** 
 
(5.28) (3.29) (2.29) (4.07) (3.56) (5.63) 
R-square; (Pseudo-R for Model 6 .30 .22 .22 .25 .26 .16 
       
Reanalyses reported below       
Charismatic signaling (verbal) 6.34** 3.38** 2.62* 5.82** 4.91** 3.78** 
 (6.50) (3.61) (2.47) (5.15) (4.43) (6.53) 
Charismatic signaling (nonverbal) -.01 .35 .33 -.01 .06 .46 
 (.02) (.79) (.63) (.01) (.12) (1.42) 
Communication Skills -.61 -.31 -.37 -.46 -.26 -.59** 
 
(1.84) (1.12) (1.10) (1.26) (.69) (3.17) 
Time -.15 -.01 -.31 -.39 -.00 -.04 
 
(.77) (.07) (1.51) (1.84) (.01) (.34) 
Rater male -.30 -.43* -.60** -.49* -.37 .07 
 
(1.65) (2.44) (2.96) (2.43) (1.84) (1.15) 
Rater age .03 -.01 .03 .03 .01 -.00 
 
(1.53) (.56) (1.39) (1.44) (.48) (.25) 
Leader fixed-effects Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. 
 
      
Constant 5.23* 4.77* 6.21** 5.26* 3.79  
 
(2.39) (2.55) (2.97) (2.26) (1.64)  
Cut 1      -3.53 
Cut 2      -2.57 
Cut 3      1.57 
 
      
F(46,134); Wald 
2
(46) for Model 6 9.37** 4.30** 4.20** 7.20** 5.71** 369.11** 





  n = 458 observations; n =135 raters evaluating n = 41 leaders. Cluster robust z-statistics (at rater level) in parentheses (note, adjusting simultaneously for leader-
level clustering changed inference only for verbal charismatic signaling in Model 3 to p = .07; nonverbal charismatic signaling remained nonsignificant). **p < 
.01, *p < .05. See Antonakis et al. (2011) Table 4 for details.  
